ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The approach adopted in this research was inspired by the popular theory of how land market processes impact on the poor outlined by Hernando de Soto in his book 'The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else' [1] . It also draws on the work of Wallace and Williamson [4] in understanding the operation and evolution of land markets. De Soto argues that the poor are often unable to reap maximum economic benefit from land assets which remain hidden within the informal sector. Until the poor receive formal, legal title for the land they occupy, their assets remain essentially 'dead' capital. The extension of formal land title is proposed as a vital determinant of economic growth and poverty reduction.
De Soto outlines a number of reasons why, in some countries, the poor have been unable to secure formal title for their land assets, including exclusion from the legal process by elites, extreme complication of formalisation procedures and the high costs of undertaking these processes. In the Philippines, for example, De Soto claims that legal purchase of a settlement on state or private land through state housing programmes requires 168 steps involving 53 state and private organisations and takes from 13 to 25 years. If that land is categorised as agricultural, additional steps for conversion to residential use take two more years [1] . A variety of similar examples are given from Egypt, Haiti and Peru. Difficulties of this kind clearly force poor households into informal land markets.
De Soto estimates the volume of 'dead capital' held by the poor at 9.3 trillion USD globally and identifies six ways in which formal land title and land administration systems can transform the value of land assets to the benefit of the poor and of society in general: a. Formal land titles have an abstract economic value, valid in a wide range of contexts, which untitled physical assets alone cannot have. ("Fixing the economic potential of assets"). b. With a national system of formal land title, economic value implicit within land title has generic worth recognised consistently throughout society. ("Integrating dispersed information into one system.") c. Formal title gives landholders legal protection to their land rights from the state but, due to legal mechanisms for forfeiture of title, also creates pressure to honour commitments ("Making people accountable"). d. As formal title signifies the abstract economic value of land, more flexible use of assets is possible -e.g. issuing shares in property, using property to gain access to capital ("Making assets freely exchangeable"). e. Formal property systems join land users into networks through which their assets can be assembled into more valuable combinations ("Networking people"). f. In addition to protecting ownership, formal land title systems which record and register transactions give greater confidence to parties seeking to participate in the market. ("Protecting transactions") De Soto's argument has been subject to considerable criticism. In particular, the dangers and disadvantages of informality have been questioned. It has been argued that formal tenure may not necessarily be more secure than informal tenure, while transfer and rental markets in untitled land are often vibrant [3] . Moreover, the transforming effects of land title formalisation programmes have also been questioned by some [2] . Land titling has not always led to a widening of opportunities for poor people in financial markets. Public investment in urban infrastructure, upgrading and social programmes may have more effect on informal settlements than titling.
In relation to de Soto's thesis, this research project was designed to examine: a. The extent to which the 'problem' of informality posed by de Soto is significant in rural Vietnam. b. The reasons why poor people may currently be excluded from formal land title and land markets. c. Evidence for the benefits of inclusion in the formal land market and the disadvantages and costs to the poor of continued informality.
In order to answer these questions, the research methodology focused on two main activities:
• Documenting both formal and informal land use market processes (allocation, transfer, lease and mortgaging of land use rights) as suggested by de Soto.
• Determining the quality of the recorded government land records (owner of land use rights, land use, diagram and boundaries, mortgage or restriction on land use parcel) with the actual situation on the ground."
It was decided to restrict the examination of land processes and records to lowland, rural areas where a high proportion of land use certificates have already been issued. The rural focus was justified by the concentration of poverty in Vietnam in the countryside (90% of Vietnam's poor are estimated to live in rural areas), while the lowland focus was justified by the more advanced state of land market development compared with the highlands. The research, therefore, concentrates on agricultural and rural residential land, rather than forestry or urban land.
The investigation of market processes and land market data was also designed to lead to practical recommendations to the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MONRE) on how to prevent exclusion of poor people from the formal land market and how to maximise the benefits of formal land use title for poor households. The project objectives were therefore formulated as follows:
"To undertake research to assess how the operation of the emerging land use market in Vietnam impacts the poor with particular emphasis on the implementation and impact of the current Land Law and the new Land
Law, resulting in recommendations for policy development or interventions in the land administration system to maximise their positive impact on the poor." This research on the impact of land market processes on the poor was conducted as part of the Asian Development Bank's 'Making Markets Work Better for the Poor' project 1 (MMWBP). MMWBP is a three year research project covering Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The project conducts analytical work focused on the functioning of markets and the extent to which the poor are able to benefit from them. It also builds capacity to support pro-poor market development through networking and the promotion of policy dialogue.
BACKGROUND TO LAND TENURE ISSUES IN VIETNAM
Before describing the research methods and results, it may be helpful to present an overview of the development and main features of Vietnam's land tenure system. Vietnam's current land tenure system is rooted in a fifty year history of revolutionary upheaval, land reform, central planning and collectivisation. In contrast to many other countries in Southeast Asia, the control of landlords and colonial plantation owners over land in North Vietnam was broken during the period of anti-colonial resistance and land reform in the 1940s and 1950s. Land reform in the North, however, was followed swiftly by the collectivisation of agriculture between 1958 and 1960. Private land ownership was abolished in favour of state ownership. Productive land use was monopolised by state enterprises, organisations and co-operatives.
In the South, control of agricultural land by landlords was weakened considerably during the American war both through the land reform campaigns led by the National Liberation Front within the liberated zones and the flight of landlords to the cities. Reunification in 1975 was followed by a less successful attempt to collectivise agriculture in the South in 1978-9.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, collective agriculture and the central planning system led to serious problems, including shortages, low productivity and inefficiency. Gradual decollectivisation started in 1981 with Contract 100, under which agricultural co-operatives began short-term contracting of agricultural land to individual households. Each team selected two provinces in which to conduct the survey. Within each province, two districts were chosen and within each district, two communes (see Table  1 ). Three criteria were used to select provinces, districts and communes: high levels of LURC issue, relatively developed land markets and high incidence of poverty. All of the 12 districts in which the research was conducted are primarily agricultural (see Table 2 ). However, many are starting to experience the effects of a certain degree of urbanisation:
• Vi Thanh district has become the new provincial capital of Hau Giang province after its recent split from Can Tho province. There is pressure for switching from agricultural to residential land use as a result. • Huong Thuy district, situated on the edges of the city of Hue, is also experiencing urban encroachment.
• In the North, industrial zones and commercial-tourist zones are being established in all four of the districts surveyed. Industrialisation and urbanisation pressures are strongest in Dinh Bang and other communes of Tu Son district.
It was agreed that the three teams would investigate: • Four types of land market process: the initial allocation of LURCs, transfer (salepurchase) of land use rights, rental and mortgage.
• Transactions when conducted formally, according to the full legal requirements, and informally, without legal registration.
• Descriptions of formal transactions from the perspective of local land administration officials (commune cadastral officers and District DONRE), as well as from the perspective of households actually involved in the transactions.
• Detailed procedural steps, parties involved, costs incurred and the time required to complete transactions, to be documented in flow charts.
• Particular regulations, local variations, difficulties and issues relevant to these transactions, to be noted next to the flow charts.
• At least six individual case studies of households involved in the three targeted types of land transaction, both formal and informal. It was agreed that representatives of the following district level government departments would be interviewed: District People's Committee, Department of Natural Resources and the Environment (DONRE) or local equivalent, Tax Department and Vietnam Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) branch. In some cases, research teams also held meetings with equivalent departments at the provincial level.
The research teams were asked to interview at least 80 households in each region (10 per commune). The main selection criterion was that the household had been recently involved in one of the targeted types of land transaction, either formally or informally. Teams were encouraged to include as many poor households as possible within the interview sample. It should be emphasised that, as the field work was not aimed at measuring land market development or the extent of informality, the interview sample was not designed to be representative of the general population in the localities selected. Rather, the sample was specifically designed to include as many land market participants as possible who could shed light on the processes involved.
In practice, household interviews covered a total of 348 transactions (see Table 3 ), of which 249 were formal land transactions and 99 were informal transactions. Sale purchases were the most frequently discussed transactions (158 cases), followed by mortgage (122 cases) and rental (68 cases). The Central study team reported that 11% of their 91 interviewees were poor households. Four of the 76 interviewees in the Northern study were categorised as poor under criteria established by the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) 5 . None of the interviewees in the Southern study were officially poor by MOLISA criteria, though the team judged 20 out of 76 interviewees to be poor by subjective assessment. RESULTS The research results summarised below are outlined in detail in the three regional studies, the land administration report and the project summary report, all of which are available on the Making Markets Work Better for the Poor website (http://www.markets4poor.org).
Extent of informality
The research showed that significant progress has been made in the granting of formal land use titles to households. LURCs for agricultural land have been granted to over 70% of households in 10 of the 12 districts surveyed (see Table 4 ). 
ND = No determination
There are two main types of LURC issue: mass issue on a village or commune wide basis and individual issue, often requested by households prior to transferring or mortgaging land. The procedures for LURC issue are clearly set out in a Circular of the General Department of Land Administration 6 . In all three studies, it was reported that LURC issue took from 1 to 2 months, excluding time for land survey which, in the case of mass issue, could take several months. Figure 1 contains an example flowchart for LURC issue documented in the Central region study. Administrative costs (purchase of application forms, cadastral fees etc.) were low 7 , with charges of 10,000 VND to 50,000 VND (approximately 0.64 -3.18 USD), excluding surveying costs, per LURC reported. This situation contrasts sharply with some of the examples quoted by De Soto of time and cost associated with formalisation of land tenure in the Philippines and elsewhere.
As land values increase, households increasingly seek to register land use right transfers formally. Procedures are relatively quick and simple 8 . Most land use transfers 
If rejected
If disputed duty 9 . Table 5 contains an example of a formal land transfer transaction documented in An Giang province. The An Giang survey showed that the formal land market is relatively active: around 5% of agricultural land plots are transferred formally each year (see Table 6 ). Table 7 ). Mortgage procedures take from 5 days to 2 weeks to complete and the administrative costs of processing are low (2-30,000 VND per transaction i.e. approximately 0.13 -1.91 USD). Figure 2 contains an example of a formal mortgage transaction with the Vietnam Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development documented in the Northern region study.
Informality continues to thrive, however, in various sections of the land market:
• The issue of LURCs is proceeding more slowly for residential land than for agricultural land. In only 2 of the 12 districts surveyed have more than 70% of households received LURCs for residential land (See Table 4 ).
• The land rental market remains almost exclusively within the informal sector.
Neither landholders nor cadastral authorities seem interested in registering rental transactions.
• While it is impossible to quantify the scale of informal sales, transfers are sometimes left unregistered, or are registered semi-formally at commune level only. This phenomenon is most common when transacting parties know each other well or are related, when the plot does not have an LURC and when it is intended that land use purpose will be changed.
• Despite the growth in bank mortgages, an informal 'mortgage' transaction known as 'co dat' thrives in the Mekong Delta. 
Household level
Borrower collects application form from the district bank branch.
Time: 1 day

Household level
Borrower requests Commune People's Committee to certify the LURC or other document verifying land use right for mortgage purposes.
Time: 1 -2 days
Household level
Borrower compiles documentation, including: business plan, ID card, LURC or other legal document verifying land use right certified by Commune People's Committee, permanent residency certificate.
Time: 1 -2 days
District bank branch
Bank staff assist the borrower to fill in the mortgage contract, business plan, request for registration of a mortgage, Cost: 0 -5000 VND Time: 1 hour
Credit officer visits borrower to appraise land, assets and completes the Assets Examination Form.
Time: Within 1 week
District bank branch
Credit officer submits the credit appraisal form to the head of the Credit Department and Branch Director for approval.
Time: 1-2 days
District bank branch
Head of the Credit Department and Branch Director approve the loan and return the file to the credit officer.
Time: 1 -2 days
Commune level
After appraisal, the borrower sends the application file to the commune cadastral officer, for certification that the land has not yet been mortgaged.
Cost: 0-60,000 VND Time: within a week
Commune People's Committee Chairman approves the mortgage, signs and stamps the application form. The commune cadastral official records the mortgage in the Mortgaged LURC book.
Time: 1 -2 days
District bank branch
Credit officer sets the loan amount, term, interest rate and notifies the borrower of the date on which the loan will be disbursed.
Time: within a week
Household level
Borrower travels to the district bank branch and signs the mortgage contract (2 copies) Time: ½ day
Borrower receives the loan and retains a copy of the contract and a loan book. The bank retains the LURC.
Time: ½ day
Household level
Borrower pays the interest at intervals specified in the loan contract.
The borrower repays the principal in full, after which the district bank branch returns the LURC to the borrower 'Co dat'-informal mortgages in the Meking Delta. 
Reasons for informality
The causes of continued informal land tenure and transactions can be traced both to land users themselves and the formal system of land administration. i) Lack of awareness or information on the part of land users. In a number of cases in the Southern study, failure to register transactions resulted from land users being unaware of the dangers of informality. One household purchased a plot even though the seller refused to transfer formal title. Other households bought land already mortgaged to the bank and therefore were unable to register the transfers. ii) Problems with the issue of LURCs. Particular problems with LURC issue include:
high land use levies charged for the issue of LURCs on residential land and for the conversion of garden to residential land 10 (see Table 8 ). For example, levies of 100% of the plot value are charged on residential land occupied since 1993. In one An Giang commune, 483 out of 908 residential LURCs had been left uncollected at the commune office because land holders were reluctant to pay the land use levies.
More detailed information from An Giang province gives some idea of the level of payments. Provincial land area ceilings effective in An Giang are 300 m 2 per household for urban areas and 600 m 2 per household for rural areas. According to provincial price frameworks, residential land in Thoai Son district is valued at 6100 VND per m 2 . A household seeking issue of an LURC on a 600 m 2 residential plot occupied since after 1993 would therefore have to pay 3,660,000 VND (approximately 230 USD) in land use levy to receive the certificate.
Other issues related to the issue of LURCs include:
• Relatively high plot surveying costs borne by land users seeking individual LURC issue in some areas (300,000 VND, or approximately 19 USD, per 1000 m 2 quoted in An Giang).
• In some cases, the skills of cadastral officials have been a significant constraint to land titling.
• The legal ceiling on maximum agricultural land holdings of 3 ha per household also has some impact in Southern Vietnam where average land holdings are much higher than in the North and Centre. Households with larger landholdings have to avoid this restriction by means of transferring legal ownership to other relatives. iii) Problems with registering LURC transfers. Local informal 'fees' were reported as a particular obstacle to formal registration in North and Central Vietnam. The Northern study comments "Of the households interviewed, those who agreed to informal fees paid an average of 50,000 to 500,000 VND (approximately 3.18 -31.85 USD) on top of the tax for the land transaction. One household has waited over a year for the commune to measure their land because they did not pay the informal fees of 300,000 VND required by a commune cadastral official. There were also 2 cases that the procedure lasted for 6 months though the buyer had to pay 50,000 VND to the commune cadastral officer for his help." In the central study, a case was found of systematic informal fees levied by the commune authorities being semi-'formalised' as a compulsory contribution to a commune infrastructure fund. Other obstacles to formal registration of land transfers include:
• Local officials sometimes requiring extra documentation to process transfers (e.g. signatures of neighbours, copies of buyer's residency registration etc.).
• Costly and time consuming procedures for transfer of land on which an LURC has yet to be issued as allocation and transfer processes have to be completed simultaneously.
• Negotiated and untransparent processes of land valuation for transfer tax purposes resulting form the wide disparity between provincial land price frameworks and actual market prices.
• Active intervention by local governments in some provinces like Hau Giang to prevent transfers of small land plots in an attempt to prevent plot fragmentation.
iv) Problems with mortgaging LURCs. Some cases of unofficial fees demanded by bank officials were discovered in the Northern districts. "Two households paid unofficial fees (100,000VND and 200,000 VND respectively) in order to get loans. These individuals were asking for loan sizes over 10 million VND. To quicken the borrowing process, two other households paid 100,000 VND to bank staff. One household received the loan within 1 day paying an unofficial fee of 50,000 VND." Internal bank regulations -including limits on lending up to 50% of the value of agricultural land use rights used as collateral -were cited as constraints in the Southern study.
EFFECTS OF INFORMALITY
De Soto argues that formal land title would have a range of 'property effects' which increase the value of land to the landholder and to society as a whole. The case studies selected by the three research teams do show some of the adverse effects that continued informality can have in the rural land market:
• Households without formal tenure were unable to gain the full value of their assets when selling land use rights on the market. Evidence also suggests that, despite the lack of any formal registration, thriving land rental markets have developed in rural areas. Formal land title was found in some districts to not be an essential condition for mortgaging land with the banks. The cost and inefficiencies of legal processes for foreclosure on collateral also raise questions about the decisive role of legal land title in the mortgage market.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the issues and problems described above, it is clear that an efficient and accurate formal land administration system can bring significant benefits to poor people through improved security of tenure, reduced boundary and ownership disputes, opportunities to access finance and higher land values. Making formal procedures simpler, reducing transaction costs and increasing the access of poor people to formal land registration is believed likely to contribute more to poverty reduction than measures seeking to protect poor households from market forces in land. The recommendations that follow are therefore aimed at increasing the efficiency, speed and inclusiveness of land market mechanisms in the context of implementing Vietnam's new Land Law.
In addition to the policy recommendations, the research shows that the methodology of documenting transaction processes as proposed by Hernando de Soto, and subsequently expanded and refined, for both formal and informal processes, was a useful tool for examining the extent of informality, its causes and its impact on the poor. It is planned that this methodology will be adapted for use in a study of urban land issues and poverty in Vietnam in a future research project.
The key recommendations for improving the operation of the land market as a result of this research are as follows: Improved infrastructure. Support is needed for the establishment of new provincial and district land registries which will provide the land registration services outlined in the new Land Law. Increased capacity. The shift from a state management to a service provision culture within the land registries will require significant investment in training at all levels. Increased public awareness. Public awareness campaigns are necessary to publicise the obligations and rights of land users, particularly with regard to cost and time promises for the delivery of services. Clear commitment on time and cost. To ensure compliance with commitments on the cost and time of services outlined in the new Land Law, action will be needed to ensure efficient complaint channels, oversight of land administration services, perhaps by civil society organisations, and adequate funding of land administration offices. Affordable fees and taxes. With the imminent issue of new decrees on land taxes and levies, it is important to ensure that fees are low enough to bring people into the formal system and to keep them there. International best practice suggests that the cost of initial allocation of title should be underwritten by the state. The issue of land use levies on residential land should therefore be closely monitored. Transfer taxes at present are currently low enough -and should not constitute a disincentive for formal registration. Implementation of positive steps on women's land rights and fee waivers. The new Land Law includes measures to safeguard women's rights to matrimonial property and to reduce or waive land fees and levies for registered poor households. Priority should be given to implementation of these measures. Review scope of state land administration role. In order to reduce administrative workload and increase efficiency, a number of streamlining measures should be considered. After the introduction of a land title system on the Torrens model at district level land registries, it may not be necessary for communes to keep duplicate records of cadastral information. The need to register rental transactions could also be reviewed. Annual and five yearly land inventories may not be necessary when new land registries update transactions within set time limits.
